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ABATEMENT OF BUILDINGS AS PUBLIC NUISANCES
By A. C. VAN SOLEN
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served in the U.S. Air Force 1917-
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Law Department in 1920 and has
served as Corporation Counsel
since 1930. He was president of
NIMLO in 1954; received the Insti-
tute's Annual Award for Distin
guished Public Service, 1957; and
is now a member of the Board of
Trustees of the Institute.
The power of public authorities, particularly municipal corpor-
ations, to order the destruction of a building without compensation
as a matter of public protection, has long been of interest to at-
torneys for municipal corporations, as the moving parties, and to
private practioners. It is my purpose here to suggest a manner
whereby the destruction of buildings deemed to be a public nuis-
ance may be accomplished, without undue delay, under a valid
exercise of police power.
The line between the eminent domain provision of the Federal
Constitution requiring compensation for property taken for public
use and the proper exercise of the police power has rested on the
question as to whether there has been an appropriation, plus a tak-
ing. If these two elements exist there is a taking for which com-
pensation must be awarded.1 If the element of appropriation is
missing, and there is merely a destruction for the public welfare,
the police power of the state has been called into play.
2
It is not enough that a city say the destruction is necessary for
the public welfare, for not only must the ends be reasonable but the
means must be appropriate.3 Further, procedural due process must
be satisfied to the extent that a citizen's property will not be sub-
jected to the possibly arbitrary and irresponsible action of a group
of citizens4 or the city itself,! that the property owner be given
adequate notice, and that a full hearing be afforded.6
When faced with the problem as to how to safely proceed
toward the destruction of certain buildings without compensation as
a matter of public protection, the City of Seattle, Washington, first
brought a civil action seeking abatement by judicial process upon
1 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
3 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
4 See note 2 supra; cf., Eubank v. Richmond, 266 U.S. 137 (1924).
5 Nashville v. Weakley, 170 Tenn. 278, 95 S.W.2d 37 (1936).
6 Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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a finding of a public nuisance. This procedure proved to be impracti-
cal and was abandoned because it involved a title report, service of
process, establishment of jurisdiction, findings of fact, conclusions of
law, judgment, and an order of execution addressed to the sheriff
of the local county, who required a bond for his protection,-all of
which took, on the average, nine months to a year's time.
Now, the procedure for summary abatement in Seattle is as
follows: When the local legislative authority, upon petition or its
own motion, finds that a certain building is in such condition as to
be a danger to the public, a complaint is referred to the heads of
administrative departments of the city, particularly of the fire,
health and building departments, who are concerned with the pub-
lic peace, health, safety and welfare of the citizens, to make findings
of fact as to the condition of the building and in what respects and
to what extent the public may be affected thereby. The findings are
transmitted back to the local legislative authority, which legisla-
tively adopts such findings by specific ordinance and declares that
by reason of such facts the building constitutes a danger to the pub-
lic and a nuisance and should be summarily abated, and provides for
notice to the property owner to correct the dangerous conditions
within a certain time. If the property owner fails to correct the
dangerous conditions, the administrative officer designated, usually
the chief of the fire department or the superintendent of buildings,
is authorized and directed to destroy the buildings.
In the past this procedure has involved little or no expense
to the city because the contractor employed by the administrative
officer did the work for the salvage. This is no longer practical and
the city has recently expended certain public moneys in connection
with the demolition which it has sought, without too much success,
to recover from the often absentee owner. This procedure is an
extreme remedy which is not often used but has not been chal-
lenged in the courts and in my opinion is lawful.
There has been at least judicial recognition of this procedure in
the state of Washington7 and by way of dictum the court suggests
that if the officer involved acts under an appropriate ordinance, he
will not be personally liable because the doctrine of respondeat
superior applies even if it is found that the abatement was unlaw-
ful because no nuisance in fact existed, in which case the mun-
icipality is liable for taking or damaging under the state constitu-
tion.8 An interesting Colorado case in which the latter result was
reached is McMahon v. City of Telluride.9 The court reasoned that
since there was no nuisance to abate there must have been an
element of appropriation.'0 Thus the building was deemed to have
been taken for public use and required the loss to the owner to be
compensated for by the municipality.
It is only under the auspices of emergency, grounded on the
imminence of harm, that a building may be demolished without
previous judicial or quasi-judicial process." If the property is in
fact a nuisance, the owner has no constitutional right to maintain it,
7 Hotel Cecil Co. v. City of Seattle, 104 Wash. 460, 177 Pac. 347 (1918).
8 Ibid.
9 79 Colo. 281, 244 Pac. 1017 (1926).
10 See note 1 supra.
11 E.g., Miller v. Valparaiso, 10 Ind. App. 22, 37 N.E. 418 (1893).
DICTA
JULY-AUGUST 1960
and when that nuisance creates an imminent danger, a necessity
for immediate action arises.12.
Although, one has no right to maintain his property as a public
nuisance, it is equally clear that he has a constitutional right to
have the fact of the nuisance determined in accordance with the due
process clause. A mere declaration by the city that a certain build-
ing is a nuisance is not tolerated."3 Without question, the general
rule is that, except in cases of immediate necessity, public author-
ities may not destroy a building without prior notice and a hearing
as provided by law, irrespective of the fact of an actual nuisance.
14
The same result has been reached when there has been a legislative
determination in advance as to what is a nuisance. 5
The limitations on the police power in this area are not wholly
unstaked. Buildings cannot be destroyed under this power merely
because they are unsightly and offend the aesthetic refinements of
the citizens.1 6 On the other hand, the emergency doctrine is given
broad application when there is a fire hazard.17 If the building in fact
violates an ordinance setting fire limits, i.e., bounds within which
buildings of combustible materials cannot be erected, it is a nuisance
per se and the owner has no right to complain of summary action. 8
Another factor which enters into the reasonableness of a city
council's order to destroy is whether there is a more appropriate
means to remedy a nuisance than destruction. Generally speaking,
there may be a valid exercise of the police power by a state despite
an alternative means to accomplish the same end.' 9 However,
since the remedy here is extreme, the alternative means, e.g., rea-
sonable alterations and repairs instead of destruction, has been giv-
en special countenance by the courts.
20
In conclusion there remains only to be considered the question
whether the power and authority of municipal corporations in
the exercise of the police power to provide for abatement of build-
ings as public nuisances by destruction in the manner herein sug-
gested and without liability if the nuisance in fact, exists, is aug-
mented by laws relating to urban renewal. This question has
not, to the writer's knowledge, been a d d r e s s e d to or
passed on by the courts but, generally speaking, it would seem that
urban renewal laws do not change the questions of law and fact,
authority and liability above discussed, although such urban re-
newal laws do in many instances undertake to define "blight" in
such a manner as to purport to extend the powers of abatements by
destruction of buildings even if they are not in law or fact "public
nuisances."
12 Ibid.
13 Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. ,497 (1870).
14 E.g., Lyons v. Prince, 281 N.Y. 557, 24 N.E.2d 466 (1939).
15 Nashville v. Weakley, 170 Tenn. 278, 95 S.W.2d 37 (1936).
16 E.g., Crossman v. Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923).
17 King v. Davenport, 98 III. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89 (1881). But see Bennington v. Hawk, 100 Vt.
37, 134 A. 638 (1926).
18 Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 81 (1950).
19 E.g., Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
20 State Fire Marshal v. Fitzpatrick, 149 Minn. 203, 183 N.W. 141 (1921), Iverson v. Keedick, 151
Neb. 802, 39 N.W.2d 797 (1949).
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